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Market, State and Third Sector in Employment Policy:  
An International Comparison 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Recently, the institutional division of labor between the governmental sector, the private sec-
tor and the nonprofit sector has reappeared prominently on the research agenda of social and 
political scientists. The John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (see 
www.jhu.edu/~ips/research/n_s/project.html) has contributed to this renewed attention, but 
also social, economical, ideological and religious developments have pointed the attention 
towards the questions which activities can or should be carried out by the market, for which 
services and goods the state should be responsible and which role is reserved for the nonprofit 
sector.  
While the term “non-profit sector” refers to a relatively well-defined organizational universe 
in the United States, the term seems less precise when used to distinguish such sectors in most 
European countries. Therefor, also the term “third sector” is often used to designate all or-
ganizations that are neither profit-oriented businesses nor governmental agencies or bureauc-
racies (cf. Seibel & Anheier, 1990: 7). In this paper, both terms are used to refer to the waste-
land between state and market.  
 
In an international context, remarkable differences can be found with regard to services that 
are provided by the state, by the market or by nonprofit organizations. For instance, Anheier 
(1990: 48) uses an example from Hood (1984) regarding rural fire services and lifeboat ser-
vices. In Britain, lifeboat services are provided by voluntary organizations, while rural fire 
services are the responsibility of the local authorities. In Sweden, lifeboat services are state 
organizations, whereas rural fire services are run by voluntary organizations. In West Ger-
many, both services are in the nonprofit sector. 
These differences in the division of labor between state, market and third sector are of course 
not exclusively for lifeboat services or rural fire services. Both within and across countries, an 
enormous variety can be found with regard to which institutional domain supplies which 
goods or services. In this paper, the role of public sector, private and nonprofit organizations 
in the field of social welfare and labor policy stands central. According to Kramer (1990: 
255), also welfare states vary considerably in the extent to which they utilize non-
governmental agencies. “The Netherlands, where voluntary agencies constitute the primary 
social service delivery system, stands at one end of the continuum; Sweden, where practically 
no voluntary agencies are used, although some are subsidized for the purposes of advocacy, 
stands at the other”. 
In addition, in the field of welfare policy a lot of dynamics can be found in various countries 
all over the world. Transformations take place in the contents of welfare and labor policies, 
the public opinion on welfare and labor policies, and the institutional design of the field. For 
instance in the Netherlands within the last decade a move has been made from a welfare sys-
tem in which the non-profit sector took a central place, via a market-like system, to a system 
in which the state is the most important player.  
 
In this paper, the central question is: what factors influence the choice for a market, state or 
non-profit based system of welfare and labor market policies and how can the dynamics be-
tween these spheres of governance be explained? 
In the second section of the paper, a brief review of the literature on the three spheres of gov-
ernance - market, state and non-profit sector - is given. Attention is paid to the institutional 
environments that influence the specific design of welfare systems, and the key values that 
stand central in state, market and nonprofit sector are discussed. Next, an overview is given of 
the transformations that the Dutch welfare system has gone through the last decade. In para-
graph 4, the developments in the field of labor market policy in three other countries are dis-
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cussed. In order to get a clear overview of the developments in all types of welfare states, a 
distinction is made between Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian and Continental welfare states (cf. 
Scharpf & Schmidt, 2000: 9-11). In each of these categories, one country is analyzed: the 
United Kingdom for the Anglo-Saxon type, Sweden from the Scandinavian welfare states and 
Germany and the Netherlands of the continental type. In section 6, the developments are con-
fronted with the factors that have been identified in section 2 as important explanations for 
choosing a specific sphere of governance as the guiding principle in organizing the welfare 
state. Finally, some conclusions are drawn and a research agenda is proposed.  
 
 
2. Market, state and third sector: An overview  
 
Although the amount of literature on the three spheres of governance is overwhelming, it is 
still quite hard to obtain a more or less objective comparison of the market, state and third 
sector as modes of governance. Most arguments for one sphere of governance are derived 
from failures of the other spheres. In this section, a first attempt is made to outline the 
strengths and weaknesses of each of the modes of governance. 
 
 
State 
 
According to Arts (1991: 5) the concept of a state refers to a decision-making and coordinat-
ing mechanism that rests on a network of centrally coordinated activities of a large number of 
actors who make decision collectively. The state has a territorial base, a certain population 
and an organizational unity.  
According to Hoogerwerf (1995: 46-48) three types of explanations can be given for the de-
velopment of the state. The first is Rousseau’s idea of a social contract that people have 
agreed upon. In a society without a state, no one ever can be sure of his own freedom and 
property rights. Rousseau regards the state as a mechanism to protect the freedom of persons 
and goods. A second perspective on the development of the state can be found in Marxism. In 
the eyes of Friedrich Engels, the state is a means to maintain the class differences. The state 
seemingly is above the classes and tries to limit the conflict between classes, but in fact it is a 
tool of the ruling class. In more modern approaches, the development of the state is explained 
by the interaction of three factors: the total population and population density of the society, 
economical factors, and ideological factors. Economical factors refer to the availability of 
resources, technological advancement, knowledge, division of labor and system of distribu-
tion. Ideological factors refer to political values, notions of order and law, and religion.  
 
From a welfare economical point of view, five tasks for the state as a mode of governance can 
be defined (cf. Rosenthal et al., 1996: 69-79): 
1. Prevention of monopolies and trusts. This task is aimed at the protection of the market in 
order to ensure a fair amount of competition;   
2. Production of collective goods. Collective goods are non-excludable. This is the reason 
why it is economically unattractive to produce these types of goods. National defense 
and dikes are examples of collective goods. In this task, the state serves as an addition to 
the market; 
3. Regulation of externalities. Production of goods can have external effects: pollution, 
danger, and other types of inconveniences. Individual producers usually can shift on 
these external effects to society. So here the state serves as a protection against the mar-
ket.  
4. Controlling merit goods. Sometimes, the market produces goods of which it is desirable 
that people are encouraged to use them (culture, education) or discouraged to use them 
(alcoholics, tobacco). The state serves as a correction on the market.  
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5. Redistribution of income. The market produces inequalities. Some people are more suc-
cessful than others. Some people hardly can function in a market system. So a function 
of the state is to compensate for inequalities of the market.   
 
As far as the state is concerned, two specific deficiencies stand out as of particular impor-
tance. One is the limit of legal regulation, especially in terms of the implementation of regula-
tory programs. (Streeck & Schmitter, 1991: 236). Mayntz (1993: 13) states that when govern-
ing by the state fails to meet its goals, this can be attributed to several causes. Firstly, regula-
tory policies can fail because they cannot be implemented. This can have two reasons: be-
cause of the fact that the executive authorities are unable to enforce the norms (implementa-
tion problem) or because the target groups are not willing to comply (motivation problem). 
Another problem arises when, even if the rules are being complied with, the problem does not 
disappear or when all kinds of unwanted side effects appear. This may be due to deficient 
knowledge of causal relationships (knowledge problem) or to the impossibility to intervene in 
a goal-directed way in certain system processes by means of the instruments that are available 
to central authorities (governability problem).  
 
Another problem with state hierarchic coordination is that it has always been associated with 
specific difficulties of legitimation. These are basically of two kinds: one involves winning 
the support and the cooperation of groups that are asked to sacrifice some of their interests in 
favour of general interests; the other involves presenting a consistent image of the societal 
role and the jurisdiction of legitimate state intervention as such – in other words, a normative 
definition of the boundaries of the modern state” (Streeck & Schmitter, 1991: 236-237).  
What is apparently common across systems in which the private sector is given a more impor-
tant role is a belief that a public bureaucracy can no longer cope with the pressures being put 
on it by budget restraints, higher client expectations and claims of inflexibility by interest 
groups and political élites. This turn away from bureaucracy is buttresses by the emergence in 
public discourse of economic theories of organization which draw on agency theory and 
transaction cost theory in order to justify quasi-market systems of service delivery (Considine, 
2000: 614).  
 
 
Market 
 
A market can be defined as “a decision-making and coordinating mechanism that rests upon  
a network of actual and potential exchange relations between individual actors making inde-
pendent choices which feature compatibility” (Arts, 1991: 5). Perfectly competitive markets 
would be an efficient coordinating mechanism. When we all compete in the market place, we 
inadvertently optimize output and minimize prices. This implies efficient production, because 
the desired result is produced, namely sufficient goods and services at minimal expense 
(idem: 11). So efficiency in the production of goods and services is an important feature of 
the market as a mode of governance. 
Moreover, the mechanism of supply and demand can be considered as an important mode of 
interaction between consumers and producers. In a perfect market, producers are more re-
sponsive to the wishes of consumers than the state can be.   
 
According to Arts (1991: 8), the history of economic life in modern societies is normally 
presented as consisting of two main periods: Firstly the expansion of markets into pre-existing 
communities in the nineteenth century, and secondly the expansion of the interventionist state 
into the new market economy in the twentieth century (cf. Streeck & Schmitter, 1991). It 
could be argued that at the end of the twentieth century, a third period has been started in 
which the market is regaining terrain from the state. Commercial enterprises discover new 
markets in the field of social security, health care, and education because the state gives up 
certain tasks in these fields (Hoogerwerf, 1995: 61). 
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However, the marketization of public life not only is caused by commercial enterprises per-
forming tasks that previously were performed by the state. Public organizations themselves 
more and more use market-like coordinating mechanisms. In their highly successful ‘Rein-
venting Government’ - that is widely regarded as the starting-point of the new public man-
agement stream in public administration - Osborne and Geabler (1992) for instance plea for a 
competitive, results-oriented, enterprising and market-oriented government.    
Of course, a central question is whether the market indeed succeeds to produce goods and 
services in a more efficient way then the state does. Dutch research on this topic is rare, but 
according to Hoogerwerf (1995: 67) it tends to agree on the conclusion that the production of 
goods and services by private companies leads to lower costs. This is usually explained by the 
absence of incentives of competitiveness and profit, combined with the presence of bureauc-
racy and the desire of budget increases by public official.   
 
Arts (1991: 12) argues that markets sometimes fail to realize and efficient allocation of re-
sources and an adequate gratification of needs in terms of goods and services. The answers 
economists tend to give to this question is generally based on market imperfections such as 
incomplete information, heterogeneous goods, monopolistic and oligopolistic power and lim-
ited competition. They also refer to the fact that competitive markets would themselves lead 
to a suboptimal production of collective or categoric goods, and are unable to solve the prob-
lem of external effects adequately (Arts, 12-13). Streeck and Schmitter (1991) agree with Arts 
when they state that concerning markets, the obvious and often analyzed problem is that the 
unregulated interaction of self-interested parties may fail to produce certain collective or 
categoric goods which are a necessary precondition for an effective functioning of the market 
(‘market failure’).  
 
Another important drawback of the market as a coordinating mechanism is its inability to deal 
with weaker players in the market. According to Streeck and Schmitter (1991) free competi-
tion may result in social cleavages and inequalities. Arts (1991: 12) states that “in large social 
groups such as societies or commonwealths, markets will not bring about an equitable income 
distribution”. According to Arts, who considers an equitable income distribution as a collec-
tive good, this failure is perfectly understandable, because the market is unable to produce 
collective goods (idem: 13).  
Within a market, the danger exists that people in an unfavorable position are excluded from 
certain services or goods. From implementation studies, we know that street-level bureaucrats 
tend to ‘cream’ their potential clients, and concentrate on the best clients within specific 
groups. Within a market, with incentives for successful job placements for instance, this dan-
ger is even greater.  
 
 
Third sector 
 
As I stated in the introduction of this paper, more and more scientific and political attention is 
aimed at the nonprofit sector as a mode of governance in the welfare state. As Streeck and 
Schmitter (1991: 234-235) state, “the widely accepted antimony of state vs. market appears to 
be insufficient. The swing of the pendulum of public policy seems to be different in different 
countries, with some countries being much less torn between the two extremes than others. As 
it happens, these countries tend to be those that have relatively strong institutions, often de-
scribed as ‘neo-corporatist’ of associational and inter-associational conflict – for example 
Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, West-Germany. Institutions of this kind, in addition 
to mediating between the state and the market, seem to limit the extent to which the two can 
invade each other and enlarge their domain at each other’s expense” (Streeck & Schmitter, 
1991: 234-235). 
 
 
  5
According to Kramer (1990: 260), no consistent set of factors has yetbeen identified which 
can explain the presence of nonprofit organizations in widely different countries - democratic 
and totalitarian, highly centralized or decentralized regimes, religiously heterogeneous or 
homogeneous, etc.; or the particular mix between government, the market, and nonprofit 
organizations in different fields of service. Nor have any theories been proposed to account 
for the origin, development, and change over time of the sector or its components in relation 
to government (Kramer, 1990: 260). Up to a certain level, these statements hold true.  
A general but simple line of argument that can be found in literature is that there is a non-
profit sector because both state and market fail in providing collective, categorical goods and 
services. And Kramer (1990: 256) certainly is right when he argues that the reasons why non-
profit organizations are responsible for performing certain activities can vary across countries: 
“Voluntary agencies are used by government because, as in the United Kingdom, the Local 
Authority Social Service Departments may not have appropriate, specialized or sufficient 
resources; or because, as in Holland, they are, for historical and religio-political reasons, the 
providers of first choice, or, for more pragmatic reasons, in the United States and Israel they 
may provide an economical, flexible services which is often a means of avoiding bureaucratic 
or budgetary constraints” (Kramer, 1990: 256).  
 
However, at a general level several institutional factors can be identified that seem to influ-
ence the development of third sector organizations in a country. According to Salamon and 
Anheier (1996: 9) three sets of factors seem to be especially important in shaping the scope 
and scale of the nonprofit sector in a country: 
 
1. Heterogeneity. The existence of a nonprofit sector can be considered as a result of inher-
ent limitations of both market and state in providing collective goods. Because of their 
collective nature, such goods are generally underproduced by the market system. Accord-
ing to classical economic theory, the existence of such collective goods explains why 
government is needed in a market economy. However, the more diverse the population, 
the more difficult it is for people to agree on what collective goods should be provided. 
The result will be unsatisfied demand for collective goods on the part of different seg-
ments of the population. The function of the nonprofit sector is to meet this unsatisfied 
demand for collective goods. The greater the diversity of the population, the greater the 
size of the nonprofit sector (Salamon & Anheier, 1996: 9-10). 
2. Scope of the welfare state. The greater the scope of the welfare state in a country, the less 
unsatisfied demand for collective goods remains. So the number of nonprofit sector or-
ganizations and project is expected to be lower in more elaborate welfare states.  
3. Historical traditions. Various historical en religious traditions can encourage or discour-
age the formation of nonprofit sector organizations. For instance, in the Netherlands a 
strong tradition of subsidiarity growing out of Christian social thought has offered quite a 
hospital clime for the growth of nonprofit institutions.  
 
Furthermore, Van de Donk (2001: 17) stresses the importance of trust that is associated with 
the non-profit sector. According to him, it is likely that non-profitorganizations will emerge to 
provide goods and services for which only limited information on the quality of the service is 
available (for instance health services). It would cost consumers a lot of transactions in a 
market to make a rational choice between various suppliers. Trust in the supplier is essential 
in this case, and in the view of Van de Donk, non-profit organizations are trustworthier than 
market or state organizations. Another function of the non-profit sector is to create variety and 
multiple perspectives in policy processes. If the state does not provide all services and goods 
by itself for the total society, this opens up the opportunity to experiment with non-standards 
solutions, to innovate and to learn. This is considered as an important benefit of the non-profit 
sector (Van de Donk, 2001: 18).  
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Kramer (1990: 256) seems to agree with Van de Donk on this point: “While welfare states 
differ in the extent of their reliance on non-governmental organizations for the provision of 
social services, they all share a basic perception of voluntary agencies: these organizations are 
expected to be innovative and flexible, to protect particular interests, to promote volunteer 
citizen participation, and to meet needs not met by government”. 
Hupe and Meijs (2000: 7-8) state that nonprofit organizations can be expected to deliver 
higher quality and greater equity in service delivery. Nonprofit sector organizations are not 
primarily profit-oriented, so they can afford to provide a higher quality of service than com-
mercial enterprises and because of small scale and adaptability they are more responsive that 
governmental bureaucracies. Nonprofit sector organizations are more inclined to serve those 
in greatest need because of their access to voluntary and philantropic support, their charitable 
goals, and their more limited preoccupation with profit.  
 
Just as the state and the market as spheres of governance, the non-profit sector also has sev-
eral drawbacks. Salamon (1995: 45-49) mentions three possible failures of the non-profit 
sector:  
1. Particularism. There may be solidarity within the community for which the specific non-
profit organization was meant, but solidarity outside the community tends to be fairly 
low.  
2. Paternalism. Non-profit organizations, especially those that are based on religion, tend to 
have a view on what is good for people. Also democratic decision-making procedures are 
often absent.  
3. Amateurism. The variety of employees in the non-profit sector can be great. On the one 
hand there are high-skilled professionals, but on the other hand also volunteers who have 
the best intentions but lack professional training can be found in the non-profit sector.  
 
 
Summary 
 
In this section, very shortly the most important features of state, market and third sector as 
spheres of governance have been presented. In table 1, the characterizing institutional envi-
ronments, key values and drawbacks that are connected which each of these spheres of gov-
ernance, are summarized. However, the characteristics in this table should be seen more as 
ideal types. As Kramer states, the organizational differences between non-profit organizations 
and other providers of social services (state and market) have diminished considerably, be-
cause they all draw their funds from the same governmental sources, are subject to the same 
regulations, and utilize the same types of professionals and other staff members (Kramer, 
1990: 256). In the real world, hybrid organizations can be found that combine several charac-
teristics out of different spheres of governance. However, in the next sections I will show to 
what extent the characteristics that are presented in this table have played a role in the institu-
tional design and dynamics in the field of labor market policy in various European countries. 
In paragraph 6, we will then be able to assess the value of this table to explain the roles of the 
state, market or nonprofit sector in each of these countries.  
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 State Market Nonprofit sector 
Institutional  
environment 
Extended welfare state Retrenchment of the 
welfare state 
Limited welfare state 
 State tradition  Nonprofit tradition 
   Heterogeneous 
 
Task Production of collective goods Production of private 
goods 
Production of  
categorical goods 
 - Protecting of the market  
- protecting against the market; 
- correcting the market ;   
- compensating the market;   
 
  
Key values Equity Efficiency Equity 
 Coverage Responsiveness Trust 
 
Drawbacks Limits of regulation Exclusion Particularism 
 Legitimacy Market failures Paternalism 
   Amateurism 
 
Table 1  Characteristics of state, market and nonprofit sector 
 
 
 
3. Market, State and Third Sector in the Netherlands 
 
The historical evolution of the Dutch welfare state can be divided into four stages. The first 
stage is that of the development of arrangements. It is almost impossible to determine the 
exact day of birth of welfare states. Different arrangements have evolved at different paces in 
a large period of time out of arrangements in the private or charity sector. However, according 
to Van der Veen (1999: 33) it can be stated that de modern Dutch welfare state has started at 
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. This stage of develop-
ment ended with World War II. A crucial element in this first stage was the origin of compul-
sory arrangements that came in the place of the nineteenth century arrangements that had their 
origins in the private or charity sector and that usually were voluntary. A second important 
element was the growing interference from the state with the organization and the implemen-
tation of these arrangements (idem: 34). Until World War II a slow but steady extension of 
the system of social security took place. Compared with other western countries the Dutch 
welfare state developed rather late.  
After the Second World War, this changed radically. The economic prosperity of the first 
post-war decades accommodated an extensive system of quite high benefits in the field of 
social security. Also in other policy domains the interference of the state increased. This is the 
period of the extension of the welfare state. This period lasted until the economic recession of 
the 1970’s. In this period the Dutch welfare state developed from straggler to leader.  
 
At the end of the 1960’s, the economic prosperity came to an end. Growing inflation since 
1968, in combination with two oil crises, caused a deep crisis for the Dutch welfare state. 
High unemployment rates, together with high inflation, and social trends of individualization 
and emancipation created an explosive increase of the expenditures on social security (Van 
der Veen, 1999: 42-44). In the period of the mid-seventies to the end of the 1980’s the crisis 
of the welfare state primarily was defined in terms of affordability. Van Doorn (1992: 2) 
speaks of a shift from the social to the economical perspective. Solutions also were defined in 
economic terms like cutting back benefits and making access to arrangements more difficult.  
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Although the economy started to grow again in the second halve of the 1980’s, the number of 
people that benefited from disability allowances, unemployment benefits and welfare benefits 
remained high. This causes a shift of attention towards the ways in which these arrangements 
were administrated and implemented. Van der Veen (1999: 45-47) speaks of a shift in the 
problem definition from affordability to controllability. This period is called the period of 
administrative-institutional revision of the welfare state (cf . Rigter et al, 1995: 416-420; 
Teulings et al., 1997: 253-259). 
In this period, several reform processes were initiated that are important for the division of the 
welfare system between the three spheres of governance: market, state and nonprofit sector. A 
radical revision of the welfare system in 2000 was the result of these processes. In that year, a 
new legal framework for the Dutch welfare system (the so-called SIWI-law: Structure Im-
plementation Work and Income) was adopted.  
 
In the Netherlands, the social security system can be divided in three subsystems. First, the 
employee assurances are paid for by contributions of employers and employees. The unem-
ployment benefits and disability are the most important arrangements of this type. Secondly, 
labor market policy is the responsibility of an autonomous organization, the Public Employ-
ment Service. Finally welfare benefits are the final piece of the welfare system, for everybody 
who is not able to earn a living in any other way. In the following table, it is shown that the 
impact of the five stages that have been distinguished previously has not been similar for each 
subsystem.  
 
 Employee Insurances Labor market policy Public welfare 
Development  
(1900-1945) 
Collectivization  
Corporatistic  
Voluntary (partial) 
 
Private initiative 
Decentralized 
Charitative 
Local 
Growing state contribution 
 
 
Expansion  
(1945-1970) 
Organized by branch 
Corporatistic 
Increase of coverage 
Compulsory  
 
Centralized 
Hierarchic 
Public 
Isolated from employee 
assurances and public 
welfare  
 
Decentralized  
Local 
From ‘gift’ to ‘right’ 
Crisis (1970-1990) Corporatistic 
Limits to access and 
benefits  
Organized by branch 
Internal reorganization  
Isolated from employee 
assurances and public 
welfare 
Decentralized  
State enforces limits to 
access and benefits  
 
Administrative-
institutional reform 
(1990-2000)  
Limits to role of trade 
unions and labor unions 
Privatization 
Competition 
Neo-corporatistic  
Decentralized  
Coorperation with em-
ployee assurances and 
public welfare  
 
Decentralized 
Welfare to work 
Creation of additional jobs 
SIWI (2000-2002) Integration 
Centralization  
State  
Contracting out of rein-
tegration  
 
Integration 
Centralization  
State  
Privatization of reinte-
gration  
 
Increasing local responsibil-
ity  
Welfare to work  
Contracting out of reintegra-
tion  
 
 
Table 2  Developments in three subsystems in the Netherlands   
Source  Fenger (2001: 104) 
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What considers the dynamics in the division between the roles of market, state and third sec-
tor in the administration and implementation of the Dutch welfare system, the last decade 
seems to be the most interesting. For this reason, a more detailed description of the develop-
ments in the Netherlands in the period 1990-2002 will be given. I will concentrate on the 
unemployment insurance and the employment policy.  
 
As can be seen in table 2, until 1990 organizations of employees and employers were respon-
sible for the administration of the unemployment insurance. Both at a national level, and at 
the functionally decentralized level of branches of industry: the so-called trade associations.  
The state only had a role as a supervisor in the Social Insurance Council that consisted of 
three parties: employer’s organizations, labor unions and the central government. (Bannink, 
1999: 58; Rigter et al., 1995: 252-254). But as a result of the ever-increasing appeals on un-
employments benefit, disability allowances and welfare benefits and the ongoing criticism on 
the quality of the process of administration, the role of the trade associations became a point 
of discussion. When the Supreme Court of Audit in 1992 observed that the supervision of 
Social Insurance Council was inadequate and that independent supervision could increase the 
controlability, the parliament came into action. A parliamentary investigation committee was 
installed (Roebroek & Hertogh, 1998: 419-420; Van den Heuvel, 1995: 22). 
 
As a result of the investigation committee, radical changes in the institutional design of the 
employee benefits were implemented. The involvement of employees and employers with the 
administration of the benefits was limited. And the Board of Supervision of Social Insurance 
was the independent successor of the Social Insurance Council. Trade associations became 
principals that had to contract administration agencies for administrating employee insurances 
for limited periods of time, four years. These administration agencies had to compete to ob-
tain contracts. Five private administration agencies were established.  
However, before the first contract period was finished, the idea of competition was torn down 
already. Two reasons can be given for this. In the first place, political parties feared that pri-
vatization of benefits could lead to unfair situations. For this reason, a cut between the ad-
ministration of the benefits and the decision upon individual claims was proposed. The idea of 
independent pilots in private agencies appeared to get a majority in parliament, but in the 
discussion with the parliament, the minister withdrew his proposal and promised to formulate 
a new proposal. The second reason was that the private administration agencies had merged 
with conglomerates of banks, insurance companies, personal finance advisors etc. Politicians 
feared an intolerable mixture of public contributions to employee insurances with private 
capital.  
In 2000, a new proposal was submitted to parliament. In this proposal, the five private ad-
ministration agencies were merged into one national Administration Agency Employee Insur-
ance. The independent Board of Supervision of Social Insurance lost its independence and 
became also part of the national ministry. The only part in which competition was possible 
(and compulsory) is the field of activating unemployed persons. Specialized reintegration 
offices have been established, under which the former Public Employment Service. 
 
This brings us to the second part of the detailed description of the Dutch case: the employ-
ment policy. There is a great difference in the dynamics between state market and third sector 
compared with the unemployment insurance. This is illustrated also in figure 1. From the 
Second World War, employment policy had been a task of the national government (in fact, 
this had been a ‘heritage’ of the German occupation during World War 2). In the new Public 
Employment Service Law of 1990, it was decided to have national government share its re-
sponsibility with organizations of employers and employees, the so-called tripartization. 
Apart from a Central Employment Council, also regional employment councils were estab-
lished (Van Gestel, 1994: 84). 
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However, within a few years the first critics on the performance of the Public Employment 
Service could be heard. Sol (2000: 281-284) even states that the experiment with the tripartite 
governance can be called a failure. In 1995 a revision of the law took place, in which the role 
of the central government was reinforced again.  
The proposals for the SIWI law in 2000 implied a new reorganization of the public employ-
ment service. The old public employment organization was abolished. Instead, new Centres 
for Work and Income (CWI’s) were established. In the CWI, the labor office and the intake 
for unemployment and welfare benefits were integrated. The activities of the old public em-
ployment service that were aimed at reintegration of unemployed were privatized. The new 
organization, Kliq, became one of the new players in the reintegration market that was estab-
lished in 2000.  
 
In figure 1, a illustration is given of the dynamics in the involvement of the three spheres of 
governance in the Netherlands since 1990. In paragraph six, these developments will be con-
fronted with the theoretical assumptions from the second section of this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 State, non-profit and market in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
4. Market, state and third sector in international perspective 
 
In this section, a brief overview will be given of the developments in the institutional struc-
ture of welfare and employment policies in five other countries. Germany will be analyzed as 
another example of the continental welfare states. The United Kingdom will serve as an ex-
ample of the Anglo Saxon welfare states, whereas Sweden will represent the Scandinavian 
welfare states.  
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Germany 
 
Compared with the Netherlands, two characteristics of the German developments in welfare 
and employment policy stand out. In the first place in Germany there is an institutional inte-
gration of the responsibility for unemployment benefits and labor market policy in the Public 
Employment Service, the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BA). Secondly, the absence of dynamics 
until 2002 is striking.  
 
The foundations of German social insurance were laid in the 1880s with the introduction of 
health, accident and pension insurance. The rise of the welfare state was associated not with 
the replacement, but an incorporation of the private associations that had sprung up since the 
mid-19th century (Bönker & Wollmann, 2000: 328). Instead of simply being substituted by 
state institutions, the associations became part of a rather complex ‘mixed economy’, that 
combined state responsibility for social services with limits to direct state provision. The 
evolving regime reflected a historical compromise between the different social actors (idem: 
329). Heinze & Strünck (2000: 284) state that the dominance of non-profit organizations and 
the political docrtine of subsidiarity (religious autonomy) have shaped the German welfare 
system. Unlike in other countries, the Second World War did not lead to a clear break with 
pre-war social policy. Bönker & Wollmann (2000: 328) even state that for social services, the 
“German welfare state has been a frozen one, until recently characterized by a high degree of 
institutional stability and, to use a fashionable term, path dependence”. For the fields of per-
sonal social services, social housing ad health care, Bönker and Wollman (idem) are of the 
opinion that a shift towards marketization can be observed since the 1990’s. However, in the 
field of unemployment and labor market policies, the institutional dynamics only started in 
the summer of 2002, with a destructive report of the German Supreme Court of Audit on the 
performance of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit.  
 
The German labor market policy is the responsibility of the federal Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sociales). This ministry is also responsible 
for the unemployment insurance and the disability insurance. Collective social insurance 
companies that are governed by representatives of employers and employees perform the 
administration of these social insurances. The implementation of the disability insurance, the 
employment insurance and the labor market policy is carried out by the Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit. Representatives of employers, employees, and federal, regional and local authorities 
govern this organization. The majority of the financial resources come from contributions of 
employers and employees; only a limited amount comes from the Ministry. This system of 
employment policy has been incredibly stable over time. Even the persistent mass unem-
ployment that Germany faces since the 1990s and the German unification has not lead to 
fundamental changes in the system (cf. Manow & Seils, 2000).  
 
In 2002, the German Court of Audit published a destructive report on the performance of the 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. It appeared that the BA deliberately overestimated its own perform-
ance indicators. The Bundesanstalt traditionally had a strong monopoly position on interme-
diation on the labor market. The share of temporary work agencies like Randstad and Vedior 
was rather low, due to a reserved attitude of the Germans of these kinds of agencies. It is a 
still unclear what the future will bring for the institutional design of the labor market and 
unemployment policy in Germany. But against the background of the marketization that can 
be observed in other sector of social policy and the lack of flexbility in the labormarket, partly 
due to the limited position of temporary work agencies, a shift towards a more market like 
sphere of governance in my opinion would not come as a surprise.  
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In figure 2, the stable development in the fields of unemployment policy and labor market 
policy in Germany is depicted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  State, nonprofit and market in Germany 
 
 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
According to Rhodes (2000: 21), in any comparative work on the welfare state it is obligatory 
to begin with a discussion of British ‘exceptionalism’. However, as in other countries, at the 
start of the first arrangements for poor and disabled, government activity was minimal. In 
1906 a government was elected with a large Liberal majority and support from the emergent 
Labour Party. The 1911 National Insurance Act and legislation of the 1920’s created social 
insurance benefits for old, sick and unemployed. This development is relatively centralized 
and week. Limited benefits were paid by the state and did not involve any form of partnership 
with voluntary organizations or trade unions. New participants in the social policy system 
were not emerging and little was being done to strengthen those already involved (Hill, 2000: 
310). Clarke and Hoggett (2000: 225) state that the management of social insurance has not 
involved any sort of corporate arrangement with the ‘social partners’.  
 
After the Second World War, the role of the state was further elaborated in the United King-
dom. Webb and Wistow (cited in Hill, 2000: 316) write of “the surprisingly cohesive and 
widely accepted ‘pure doctrine’ of state welfare which underpinned the development of the 
post-war welfare state. The most effective and acceptable response to social problems was 
seen to involve comprehensive state social services, which were necessarily large bureaucra-
cies, and which operated through paid employees”. Hill (idem) argues that the social insur-
ance system that emerged after the Second World War often provided services far from ade-
State 
Nonprofit sector 
Market 
1990 2002 1995 
Unemployment insurance and 
employment policy  
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quately for social needs. What emerged in this period until 1980 was not a public-private 
partnership to fill the gaps, but rather a range of market initiatives.  
 
From the 1980’s, the British Thatcher period, the role of the private sector in delivering social 
services was further expanded. In the end of the 1980’s, the Department of Social Security 
was subject to a radical process of restructuring in line with the Conservative government’s 
‘Next Steps’ reforms - ie. the ‘agencification’ of central government. The administration of 
most social insurance and social assistance type benefits was devolved to the Benefits 
Agency. Since the creation of the Benefits Agency in 1991 the delivery of social security 
services has been subject to a series ofsweeping reforms exemplifying nearly all of the main 
features of the New Public Management (Clarke & Hoggett, 2000: 225). In the period from 
1991 to 1995, much value was placed on the quality of the service delivery by the Benefits 
Agency. In the period from 1995 till now, more emphasis is placed upon the introduction of 
market incentives. Areas were given executive responsibility. Some areas formed Private 
Sector Partnerships, a program in which private contractors partnered the Benefits Agency in 
delivering the service. Some units were put out to tender as free standing business units, and 
benefits processing work was outplaced (Clarke & Hoggett, 2000: 231).  
 
According to Wells (2001: 242), a central feature of the UK system is its universal welfare 
state with an extended scope but a limited generosity. The main components are universal 
public education and health systems, universal benefits for people of working age paid to 
people in respect of unemployment, sickness and disability, lone parenthood and people on 
low wages. Much of the social protection system is paid for through general taxation. So so-
cial security contributions for employers and employees are relatively low. The size of the 
public sector in the United Kingdom tends to be lower than other EU countries. As a pre-
dominantly tax-based rather than contributions based system, with no social partner involve-
ment in the management of social security, the institutional and policy linkages between so-
cial policy and the economy have always been fractured and weak (Rhodes, 2000: 19).  
 
When the welfare state was set up in the late 1940’s, compulsory labor exchanges were con-
sidered as a crucial counterbalance to any scheme of unemployment insurance. Requirements 
of active job search and availability for work were the key reasons for creating and maintain-
ing a public employment service in the UK. Still in 1995, despite the government’s predispo-
tion towards greater private sector involvement, abolition of the Public Employment Service 
was ruled out. Privatization was not considered feasible, because charging for placing would 
undermine the help for the unemployment Wells, 2001: 247).  
However, in 1997, the role of the Employment Service changed radically. The Employment 
Service became responsible for the delivery of the New Deal programs. The New Deal is one 
of the initiatives that the British government has taken in its Welfare to Work strategy. For the 
implementation of the New Deal strategy an open tendering procedure is followed. Principals 
are the regional offices of the Employment Service. Within the New Deal framework there 
are six programs for specific target groups:  
• New Deal for Young People (NDYP); 
• New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed (NDLTU/New Deal 25+); 
• New Deal for Lone Parents; 
• New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed; 
• New Deal for Disabled People; 
• New Deal 50+ (Struyven et al., 2002: 174-175). 
The New Deal at a local level is delivered through 144 so-called Units of Delivery (UoD). For 
some elements of the New Deal program, for instance the sanctioning, the Employment Ser-
vice keeps full responsibility. For some programs, a tendering procedure is compulsory, for 
instance the basic skills assistance programs. Finally, for some services a tendering procedure 
can be put out, so differences between UoD’s can occur.  
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Figure 3 State, nonprofit and market in the United Kingdom 
 
 
Sweden 
 
Despite its unique reputation, the Swedish welfare state is “clearly derivative, borrowing 
heavily from Beveridge in Britain and from the German social insurance approach developed 
in the late 1800s under Bismarck” (Olsen, 1999). The income security component of the 
Swedish welfare state has two distinct levels. The first tier, a system of flat-rate, universal and 
largely government-financed benefits, provides only basic security, but a second tier of in-
come-related, contributory social insurance programs is build upon this modest foundation. In 
the 1970’s and 1980’s, Sweden’s income security programs became more generous (with 
higher benefit levels or income replacement rates), less restrictive (with fewer waiting days, 
longer benefit periods and less stringent qualifying conditions), and more universally pro-
vided (with higher coverage rates) than in most other OECD countries (Olsen, 1999).  
Contrary to the popular belief, taxes for income security in Sweden are lower than in several 
other countries. The employer, through payroll fees, pays a much larger portion of income-
security contributions. Surprisingly, this has not lead to a high involvement of the social part-
ners in the administration of the unemployment and disability benefits.  
 
Until recently, Sweden was renowned as the definitive full employment society. Its reputation 
was based on an unmitigated commitment to full employment, n enviably low record of un-
employment, and a high proportion of female participation in the labor force. Its success was 
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at least partly a product of the labor-market policies associated with the Rehn-Meidner model. 
Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner were two influential economists from the trade unions con-
federation LO (Landesorganisation).  
 
 
The Rehn-Meidner model was first outlined in a report to the LO congress in 1951. It repre-
sented a coherent and integrated approach toward achieving full employment, structural 
change, and industrial rationalization without inflation. Rehn and Meidner proposed combin-
ing restrictive monetary and fiscal policies with a solidaristic wage policy oriented around 
average production increases and an active labor market policy facilitating the transfer of 
labor from declining regions and companies to expanding ones (Olsen, 1999; Benner & Vad, 
2000: 401).  
 
In the field of the unemployment insurance, little has been changed in the 1990s. In the early 
1990s mass unemployment made its debut on the Swedish stage. Developments that can be 
observed in answer to this are lower levels of spending in certain areas, declining public-
sector employment, and a decrease in the availability and quality of various social services. 
However, this has not yet lead to dramatic changes. It only leaded to marginal adaptation of 
the institutional structure of the Swedish welfare state (Olsen, 1999).  
This means that still the provision of almost all social services and the financing and admini-
stration of social assistance programs are primarily the concern of municipal councils and 
authorities. In addition, there are two primary passive forms of cash benefits to compensate 
the unemployed is Sweden, income-related unemployment insurance (UI) and cash labor-
market assistance (KAS). UI has been neither compulsory nor universal. It is a voluntary, 
state-subsidized and state-regulated system. People with a short work record do not qualify 
for the UI and must rely on KAS, a flat-rate benefit. This is financed by the state and em-
ployer pay-roll fees and dispensed through local insurance offices (Olsen, 1999).  
 
The employment policy also has been a task for the state, with a strong emphasis on the local 
level. Three levels can be distinguished, the national, the regional and the local level. The 
Swedish National Labour Market Administration is responsible for the implementation of the 
employment programs. It formulates directives that have to be carried out a the regional and 
local level. The local office of the Public Employment Service is the most important actor for 
the implementation of the Swedish labor market policy. Its task is to match vacancies and job 
seekers and to offer services that can facilitate the job matching. Sweden has over 400 local 
Employment Offices (Struyven et al., 2002: 205).  
 
Also in this field, little institutional dynamics can be observed, although Struyven et al. 
(2002) rightfully argue that some marketization has been introduced in the field of employ-
ment training. In 1986, the state authority for public employment training was transformed 
into an autonomous agency (AmuGruppen) and the market for state-financed employment 
training was opened up for public and private training institutions. In 1993 a second step of 
marketization was set. The  Amugruppen was transformed into a state enterprise, and level 
playing field conditions for competition were introduced. In the period form 1986 to 1999, the 
market share of the (former) state authority for employment training diminished from 100 to 
24%. However, this is the only element in the field of labor market policy in which this trend 
towards marketization can be observed.        
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Figure 4 State, nonprofit and market in Sweden 
 
 
 
 
5. Dynamics in spheres of governance: Analysis 
 
 
One of the most striking observations that can be distillated out of the descriptions of these 
countries is the divergence in developments in the last decade. This contradicts the impression 
that there is an overall shift from state and nonprofit sector towards the market sector in all 
modern welfare states. In this paragraph, we analyze to what extent the developments that 
have been observed can be traced back to the characteristics of state, market and nonprofit 
sector that have been identified in table 1. First, a brief description of each country will be 
given, and next some overall conclusions will be drawn.  
 
 
The Netherlands: Institutional Confusion? 
 
The Dutch welfare state can be characterized by turbulent developments in the last two dec-
ades. First, the Dutch disease stood for a welfare state with very high unemployment and low 
participation rates. The Dutch disease transformed into the Dutch miracle (Visser & He-
merijck). But what can be observed at the start of the twenty-first century almost can be called 
institutional confusion.  
However, what is interesting what considers the role of state, market and third sector in the 
Netherlands, is that the characteristics that have been identified, play an important role in the 
discussions on the institutional design of the welfare state in the 1990s. One of the reasons to 
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limit the role of the social partners in the unemployment insurance is the amateurism of these 
organizations, while one of the reasons to incorporate the social partners in the employment 
policy was the lack of legitimacy. Also the move from the market to the state at the end 1990s 
was defended with an appeal to the danger of exclusion and the importance of equity.  
Despite the remarkable differences in the development of the unemployment insurance and 
the employment policy, some overall observations can be made regarding the Dutch case. 
First, there is a move away from the nonprofit sector in both fields. Secondly, there has been a 
great deal of dynamics in both fields, and finally there seems to be disagreement on the opti-
mal division of various tasks between various modes of governance.  
 
 
Germany: Institutional Immobility  
 
Germany fits perfectly well in the picture of a state with a strong non-profit involvement in 
the welfare state. According to Bönker and Wollmann (2000: 329) the forging and relative 
stability of the compromise between different social actors were encouraged by religious 
heterogenity, as well as by institutional features such as federalism and the predominance of 
coalition governments (Bönker & Wollmann, 2000: 329). The importance of federalism is 
also brought forward by Grünow (2000): The fragmented structure stems from the various 
historical origins together with the emphasis on the federal constitutional imperative, which 
allocated the federal states (and thus, in addition, the communal level) responsibility for the 
organizational structures and processes of implementation. 
However, there are economical and social trends that make could have created some institu-
tional dynamics in Germany. For instance, internationalization and the decreasing role of 
religion in society could have been causes for dynamics in the spheres of governance. And of 
course the reunification of East and West Germany also could have been an occasion for a 
discussion of the institutional design of the welfare state. For this reason, the most important 
challenge for further research on the German case is to explain the absence of institutional 
dynamics within a dynamic social and economic environment.  
 
 
United Kingdom: Towards a Private Welfare State? 
 
According to Wells (2001: 242), a central feature of the UK system is its universal welfare 
state with an extended scope but a limited generosity. Much of the social protection system is 
paid for through general taxation. So social security contributions for employers and employ-
ees are relatively low. This illustrates the role of the social partners in the British welfare state 
that is traditionally limited. What is striking in the British case also is that despite the limited 
Anglo-Saxon welfare state, civil society organizations do not seem to ‘jump in the hole’. This 
is in contrast with the expectations of table 1.  
What also is remarkable in the British case is that there seems to be a well-guided trend to-
wards the marketization of social services. In addition to what I said previously of the non-
profit sector, also the private sector seems not to be very eager to fill the holes of the limited 
welfare state. All private initiative in the British welfare state evolved as a result of processes 
of privatization of former state tasks.  
 
 
Sweden: The Public Welfare State 
 
Characteristic of the Swedish welfare state in the first place is the high level of participation 
of employers and employees in trade unions and labor unions. However, this has not lead to 
an important role of the social partners in the field of unemployment insurance or employ-
ment policy. This can be explained by the extended welfare state that the Scandinavian coun-
tries traditionally have.  
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Secondly, in the 1990s the Swedish welfare state has had some forms of retrenchment. Con-
trary to what is stated in table 1, this has not been compensated by private sector activities. It 
is not clear how this can be explained, but one of the possible explanations is that the re-
trenchment has been very limited.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, the central question has been: what factors influence the choice for a market, 
state or non-profit based system of welfare and labor market policies and how can the dynam-
ics between these spheres of governance be explained?  
It appears that the institutional environment in which the welfare state evolved can explain the 
long-term development of the welfare state. The scope of the welfare state and the historical 
governance tradition are important elements of this institutional environment. However, when 
we look at the dynamics in the last decade, it is more problematic to explain the recent shifts 
or absence of shifts. Under pressure of economical and social developments transformations 
in modern welfare states almost seem inevitable. But out of the four countries that have been 
discussed in this paper, hardly any convergent trends can be distillated. Although several 
elements of the theoretical discussion of state, market and nonprofit sector can be found back 
in the descriptions of the four countries, there emerges no clear overall picture of the way 
welfare states respond to various challenges.  
 
However, there is no need to despair. This paper only has been a first exploration of the role 
of the state, market and nonprofit sector in the field of unemployment insurance and employ-
ment policy. Several themes have not been addressed. I see at least three themes that need 
further research. 
In the first place, the welfare states that have been discussed in this paper come from different 
welfare traditions. For a first exploration, I have chosen to maximize variety on the independ-
ent variable. The next challenge is to analyze the recent developments in these fields within 
welfare traditions. The most important conclusion of this paper is that common challenges to 
countries with different starting positions lead to different responses. The next question is 
what common challenges would mean for countries with common starting positions.  
Next, an important theme in institutional theory is that of institutional responsiveness. His-
torical institutionalism uses the concept of path dependency to explain resistance to change of 
welfare state regimes. However, as we have seen in this paper, a great deal of variety between 
countries in the dynamics of institutional structures can be found. To explain this, a more 
detailed analysis of institutional responsiveness is needed.  
Finally, this paper has concentrated on the institutional dynamics in welfare states. No atten-
tion has yet been paid to the effects of various institutional structures. One of the common 
challenges to all modern welfare states is the demographic trend. With the aging of the popu-
lation, a decreasing group of working people needs to earn welfare state facilities for a grow-
ing group of non-active people. Increasing labor market participation and limiting welfare 
dependence is necessarily to respond to this challenge. Further research on the effects of vari-
ous spheres of governance on limiting welfare dependency therefore is needed.  
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